

No. 12,986

United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit

ING Foo,

Appellant,

RD McGRATH, Attorney General
United States,

Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANT.

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FILED

Table of Authorities Cited

Cases	Pages
Og v. Clark, 81 Fed. Supp. 696	2
S. S. Co. v. Brown, 171 Fed. (2d) 175	3
naconda Copper Mine Co., 43 P. (2d) 663	2

Statutes

Act of 1940, Section 503 (54 Stat. 1171, 8 903)	1, 2, 3
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Texts

vidence (2d Edition), Section 176	5
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In our opening brief, we stressed the fact that a writ of habeas corpus was instituted in the United States District Court under Section 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940 (Stat. 1171; 8 U.S.C.A. 903) contemplates a trial *de novo* and not a review of the proceedings had before the United States Immigration Service. Appellant in his brief, agrees and concedes that such an appeal is a trial *de novo* but disagrees as to the meaning and interpretation of the term "de novo." He asks the question as to the admissibility of the immigration records into evidence in a case of this

(2d) 663, a Montana case, as his authority record of an administrative hearing should be admitted into evidence. This particular case can be appealed to the county district court of an appeal from a decision by the Industrial Accident Board as provided by the Workman's Compensation Act of 1917. The case is not analogous to the situation in the present case. It was an appeal where the evidence and testimony taken before the Industrial Accident Board were before the Court for consideration and the Court allowed additional testimony to be introduced. Moreover, the language of the Court in the cited case clearly explains that the use of the term "de novo" in the statute is different than it is usually meant. The judge said,

"While it is true there may be some confusion in the statute by the inclusion of the term 'de novo' that confusion has been explained by the courts. In *Dosen v. East Butte Copper Mining Co.*, 10 Mont. 579, 254 P. 880, the court explained the term 'de novo', as used in the statute, is not synonymous with the familiar trial which takes place in a district court on appeal from a justice's court."

Appellee brought forth the words of the Honorable Judge Holtzoff in *Mah Ying Og v. Clark*, 100 Mont. Supp. 696, as indicating that an action under section 503 of the Nationality Act incorporates not only evidence taken at the time of the trial, but also the reopening and review of the entire admin-

on to the opinion of the learned jurist who

The 1940 statute, however, contemplates a rearing and a full judicial hearing of the entire of citizenship without confirming it merely review of the administrative action. In a as corpus proceeding, the Court might feel it would have reached a different conclusion that reached by the administrative agency. rtheless, it would be constrained to affirm action of the administrative agency if there substantial evidence sustaining such action. *n action for a declaratory judgment under 1940 Code, however, the Court determines all e issues de novo.*" (Italics ours.)

plainly seen that the Court there was differ- between a habeas corpus proceeding where t merely reviews the administrative action oceeding under Section 503 of the Nation- where the Court determines *all of the issues*

This view was further reiterated by the Appeals in 187 F. (2d) 199, page 201, when was brought to it for consideration.

case of *Pittsburgh S. S. Co. v. Brown*, 171 e 175, the Court clearly supports this view in

n our view, it is hardly open to question hat the court below correctly held that plain- was entitled to a trial de novo on the issue nted by its complaint for injunction, and a trial contemplates what the term implies.

the hearing of evidence, as though no action had been taken. Spano v. Western Growers, Inc., 10 Cir., 83 F.2d 150, 152 Luebeck, 377 Ill. 50, 35 N.E.2d 334, 339 v. Young, Court of Appeals of Ohio, 77 C 20, 65 N.E.2d 399. In the last cited case on page 406 of 65 N.E.2d, stated:

'A trial de novo connotes an examination of testimony and an independent finding fully as though the action was originated in that court, in which event it is immaterial what errors were committed in the hearing before the board. Also it would be immaterial what the findings of the board were.'

Thus, we have no difficulty in concluding that the court properly refused to receive a transcript of testimony taken before the Commissioner on the particular issue involved in the court's opinion in the Crowell case and that the court's opinion supports such a conclusion. The court in Crowell, 336 U.S., page 297 of 52 S. Ct., stated:

'We think that the essential independence of the exercise of the judicial power of the United States in the enforcement of constitutional rights requires that the federal courts should determine such an issue upon the record and the facts elicited before them.' (Italics ours.)

We again restate our position set forth in our brief that if the appellee decides to rely upon the testimony of Wong Gong, then he should be required to testify in Court and not to rely upon

in appellee's power to produce him if he so particularly if appellee felt the testimony Gong would help to answer appellant's case.

ee contends that a mere *prima facie* showing is sufficient to establish one's United States nationality. He failed to distinguish the present judicial action from an administrative proceeding as one held by the United States Immigration Service. All the points made by appellee on this phase of his brief were purely legal proceedings and not judicial trials. The type of action is a judicial litigation where there are two parties, the proponent and the opponent. It is elementary that if the proponent makes out a *prima facie* case, not one of moral certainty or beyond reasonable doubt, but sufficient to support his allegation, the burden shifts to the opponent or defendant to answer it. If he does nothing about it, he fails and the proponent succeeds.

Whenever litigation exists somebody must go through it; the plaintiff is the first to begin; if he does nothing, he fails. If he makes a *prima facie* case and nothing is done to answer it, the defendant fails."

Principles on Evidence (2d Edition), Section 176.

appellee indulges in the false premise that when the Board of Special Inquiry found that appellant is the blood son of his father, Wong Yem, it found no evidence that appellant was attempting by fraud to enter the United States. We see nothing to

of fraud in the pleadings and answer. In findings of facts and conclusions of law of the Special Inquiry did not mention fraud as for its adverse decision.

We do not wish to burden the honorable Court with repetition of our arguments embodied in the brief. We believe the arguments and authorities submitted in that brief aptly cover our position in answer to appellee's contentions.

Wherefore, appellant prays that the judgment of the District Court be reversed and that appellant be adjudged a citizen and national of the United States.

Dated, San Francisco, California,
October 22, 1951.

Respectfully submitted,
CHOW AND SING,
Attorneys for Appellant